Files
agent-harness/agent-security/tools/audit.py
2026-07-19 20:13:54 +02:00

190 lines
6.3 KiB
Python

"""Append-only JSONL audit log for agent sessions.
Every event is written as one JSON object per line, with an auto-added
ISO timestamp and session id. The log is flushed after every record so
that a crash still leaves a complete trail. The file alone is enough
to reconstruct what the agent did, in order.
§2.4: tool results are truncated to ``MAX_RESULT_BYTES`` in the log to
prevent unbounded growth; a SHA-256 and full length are stored alongside
so the truncated entry is self-describing and tamper-evident.
§6.1: dedicated events for every decision step —
``log_permission_decision``, ``log_llm_request``, ``log_llm_response``,
``log_session_abort`` — give full forensic replay without guessing.
"""
import hashlib
import json
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
# Tool results larger than this are stored truncated in the audit log.
MAX_RESULT_BYTES = 8 * 1024
def _truncate_for_log(result: str) -> dict:
"""Return a dict describing *result*, truncating if large.
The dict always has ``size`` (bytes) and ``sha256``. If the result
is short enough it is included verbatim under ``result``; otherwise
only the first ``MAX_RESULT_BYTES`` are kept under ``result_truncated``.
"""
raw = result if isinstance(result, str) else str(result)
encoded = raw.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
digest = hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
size = len(encoded)
if size <= MAX_RESULT_BYTES:
return {"result": raw, "size": size, "sha256": digest}
truncated = encoded[:MAX_RESULT_BYTES].decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
return {
"result_truncated": truncated,
"truncated_from_size": size,
"sha256": digest,
}
class AuditLog:
"""Append-only JSONL audit log of agent activity."""
def __init__(self, log_dir: Path, session_id: str | None = None):
self.log_dir = Path(log_dir)
self.log_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self.session_id = session_id or uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]
ts = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
self.path = self.log_dir / f"audit-{self.session_id}-{ts}.jsonl"
self._fh = self.path.open("a", encoding="utf-8")
self.log("session_start", log_file=str(self.path))
def log(self, event: str, **fields: Any) -> None:
record = {
"ts": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(timespec="milliseconds"),
"session": self.session_id,
"event": event,
}
record.update(fields)
self._fh.write(json.dumps(record, ensure_ascii=False, default=str) + "\n")
self._fh.flush()
# -- convenience wrappers ------------------------------------------
def log_config(self, **fields: Any) -> None:
"""Record the session configuration (mode, sandbox root, etc.)."""
self.log("config", **fields)
def log_user_message(self, content: str) -> None:
self.log("user_message", content=content)
def log_assistant_message(self, content: str | None, tool_calls) -> None:
calls = []
if tool_calls:
for tc in tool_calls:
try:
args = json.loads(tc.function.arguments)
except Exception:
args = tc.function.arguments
calls.append({"id": tc.id, "name": tc.function.name, "args": args})
self.log("assistant_message", content=content, tool_calls=calls)
def log_tool_result(
self,
tool_call_id: str,
name: str,
args: dict,
permission_allowed: bool,
container_error: bool,
container_reason: str | None,
result: str,
intent_drift: bool = False,
intent_reason: str | None = None,
permission_reason: str | None = None,
) -> None:
self.log(
"tool_result",
tool_call_id=tool_call_id,
tool=name,
args=args,
permission_allowed=permission_allowed,
permission_reason=permission_reason,
container_error=container_error,
container_reason=container_reason,
intent_drift=intent_drift,
intent_reason=intent_reason,
**_truncate_for_log(result),
)
# -- §6.1 decision-step logging ----------------------------------
def log_permission_decision(
self,
tool: str,
args: dict,
mode: str,
allowed: bool,
reason: str | None = None,
) -> None:
"""Record a standalone permission decision (§6.1).
This is emitted *before* the tool runs (or is refused), so the
audit trail shows the decision and its reason even if the
subsequent tool execution crashes.
"""
self.log(
"permission_decision",
tool=tool,
args=args,
mode=mode,
allowed=allowed,
reason=reason,
)
def log_llm_request(
self,
model: str,
message_count: int,
token_estimate: int,
has_tools: bool,
) -> None:
"""Record that an LLM request is about to be sent (§6.1)."""
self.log(
"llm_request",
model=model,
message_count=message_count,
token_estimate=token_estimate,
has_tools=has_tools,
)
def log_llm_response(
self,
model: str,
finish_reason: str | None,
usage: dict | None = None,
message_hash: str | None = None,
tool_call_count: int = 0,
) -> None:
"""Record the LLM response metadata (§6.1).
``message_hash`` is a SHA-256 of the assistant message content
so the full conversation can be verified for forensic replay
without storing every token in the log.
"""
self.log(
"llm_response",
model=model,
finish_reason=finish_reason,
usage=usage,
message_hash=message_hash,
tool_call_count=tool_call_count,
)
def log_session_abort(self, reason: str) -> None:
"""Record that the session was aborted (§6.3)."""
self.log("session_abort", reason=reason)
def close(self) -> None:
self.log("session_end")
self._fh.close()