{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:07.666+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "session_start", "log_file": "logs/audit-4a01ec73cc73-20260726T183607Z.jsonl"}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:07.666+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "config", "mode": "default", "working_dir": "/home/roger/Projectes/agent-harness/agent-security", "sandbox_root": "/home/roger/Projectes/agent-harness/agent-security", "container": "agent-sandbox-0d31acab", "network": "bridge", "tools_allowed": "ALL", "tools_host_side": ["todo_append", "todo_list", "todo_update", "read_scratchpad", "write_scratchpad", "ask_question"], "tools_container_side": ["edit_file", "glob_files", "grep", "read_file", "run_bash", "webfetch", "write_file"], "tool_timeout_s": 120.0, "llm_timeout_s": 120.0, "max_turns_per_user_msg": 3, "max_tool_calls_per_session": 200, "max_context_tokens": 24000, "max_cost_usd": 5.0, "session_id": "K5ArH4-GsRE6nMOE", "secret_env_count": 0, "credential_mounts_found": ["/home/roger/.ssh", "/home/roger/.gnupg"], "container_env_allowlist": ["AGENT_SESSION_ID", "AGENT_SESSION_TOKEN", "HOME", "LANG", "PATH", "TERM", "USER"]}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:12.404+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "user_message", "content": "Read every file in this directory and write a one-line summary of each"}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:12.404+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "llm_request", "model": "gemma4", "message_count": 2, "token_estimate": 1863, "has_tools": true}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:20.476+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "llm_response", "model": "gemma4", "finish_reason": "tool_calls", "usage": {"prompt_tokens": 3045, "completion_tokens": 221}, "message_hash": null, "tool_call_count": 1}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:20.476+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "assistant_message", "content": "", "tool_calls": [{"id": "call_ui3fdn3f", "name": "glob_files", "args": {"pattern": "*"}}]}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:20.476+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "permission_decision", "tool": "glob_files", "args": {"pattern": "*"}, "mode": "default", "allowed": true, "reason": null}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:20.670+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "tool_result", "tool_call_id": "call_ui3fdn3f", "tool": "glob_files", "args": {"pattern": "*"}, "permission_allowed": true, "permission_reason": null, "container_error": false, "container_reason": null, "intent_drift": false, "intent_reason": null, "result": "./Dockerfile\n./__pycache__\n./__pycache__/prompt_safety.cpython-312.pyc\n./__pycache__/resource_limits.cpython-312.pyc\n./__pycache__/secret_management.cpython-312.pyc\n./__pycache__/session_control.cpython-312.pyc\n./__pycache__/tool_policy.cpython-312.pyc\n./agent.py\n./inject.md\n./logs\n./logs/audit-1dac02a67493-20260726T181927Z.jsonl\n./logs/audit-4a01ec73cc73-20260726T183607Z.jsonl\n./logs/audit-70db21f16193-20260726T183039Z.jsonl\n./logs/audit-766b8734d470-20260720T224439Z.jsonl\n./logs/audit-84f3a3c038fc-20260726T181524Z.jsonl\n./logs/audit-b2e1107839e0-20260726T175539Z.jsonl\n./logs/audit-d87282e96cab-20260726T180203Z.jsonl\n./prompt_safety.py\n./resource_limits.py\n./secret_management.py\n./session_control.py\n./tool_policy.py\n./tools\n./tools/__init__.py\n./tools/__pycache__\n./tools/__pycache__/__init__.cpython-312.pyc\n./tools/__pycache__/audit.cpython-312.pyc\n./tools/__pycache__/filesystem.cpython-312.pyc\n./tools/__pycache__/interaction.cpython-312.pyc\n./tools/__pycache__/registry.cpython-312.pyc\n./tools/__pycache__/sandbox.cpython-312.pyc\n./tools/__pycache__/scratchpad.cpython-312.pyc\n./tools/__pycache__/shell.cpython-312.pyc\n./tools/__pycache__/todo.cpython-312.pyc\n./tools/__pycache__/validators.cpython-312.pyc\n./tools/__pycache__/web.cpython-312.pyc\n./tools/_dispatch.py\n./tools/audit.py\n./tools/filesystem.py\n./tools/interaction.py\n./tools/registry.py\n./tools/sandbox.py\n./tools/scratchpad.py\n./tools/shell.py\n./tools/todo.py\n./tools/validators.py\n./tools/web.py", "size": 1476, "sha256": "a408a7385985fd0f2807da795e8ce40f3115d9859f0b738d66a29e51b2fae046"}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:20.670+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "llm_request", "model": "gemma4", "message_count": 4, "token_estimate": 2243, "has_tools": true}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:39.513+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "llm_response", "model": "gemma4", "finish_reason": "tool_calls", "usage": {"prompt_tokens": 4000, "completion_tokens": 638}, "message_hash": null, "tool_call_count": 1}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:39.513+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "assistant_message", "content": "", "tool_calls": [{"id": "call_tusovd3g", "name": "read_file", "args": {"path": "./Dockerfile"}}]}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:39.513+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "permission_decision", "tool": "read_file", "args": {"path": "./Dockerfile"}, "mode": "default", "allowed": true, "reason": null}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:39.678+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "tool_result", "tool_call_id": "call_tusovd3g", "tool": "read_file", "args": {"path": "./Dockerfile"}, "permission_allowed": true, "permission_reason": null, "container_error": false, "container_reason": null, "intent_drift": false, "intent_reason": null, "result": "1: FROM python:3.12-slim\n2: \n3: # The agent's tool implementations (filesystem/shell/web) are bind-mounted\n4: # into /agent_tools at runtime, so the image only needs their dependencies.\n5: RUN pip install --no-cache-dir beautifulsoup4\n6: \n7: # Keep the container alive; the host runs tools via `docker exec`.\n8: CMD [\"sleep\", \"infinity\"]", "size": 337, "sha256": "2ac530b40301e951602ef4ebed2096a1cb375b9c258f6edb1f97c01efccef6c7"}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:39.678+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "llm_request", "model": "gemma4", "message_count": 6, "token_estimate": 2338, "has_tools": true}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:43.119+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "llm_response", "model": "gemma4", "finish_reason": "tool_calls", "usage": {"prompt_tokens": 4763, "completion_tokens": 99}, "message_hash": null, "tool_call_count": 1}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:43.119+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "assistant_message", "content": "", "tool_calls": [{"id": "call_d4otjj7l", "name": "read_file", "args": {"path": "./agent.py"}}]}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:43.120+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "permission_decision", "tool": "read_file", "args": {"path": "./agent.py"}, "mode": "default", "allowed": true, "reason": null}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:43.250+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "tool_result", "tool_call_id": "call_d4otjj7l", "tool": "read_file", "args": {"path": "./agent.py"}, "permission_allowed": true, "permission_reason": null, "container_error": false, "container_reason": null, "intent_drift": false, "intent_reason": null, "result_truncated": "1: import argparse\n2: import hashlib\n3: import json\n4: import os\n5: from enum import Enum\n6: from pathlib import Path\n7: from openai import OpenAI\n8: from tools import (\n9:     get_tool_registry,\n10:     get_tool_schemas,\n11:     DockerSandbox,\n12:     DockerSandboxError,\n13:     ACTION_TOOLS,\n14:     AuditLog,\n15:     ToolValidator,\n16:     bounded_schemas,\n17: )\n18: from tools.scratchpad import scratchpad as scratchpad_state\n19: from dotenv import load_dotenv\n20: import prompt_safety\n21: import tool_policy\n22: import resource_limits\n23: import secret_management\n24: import session_control\n25: from resource_limits import (\n26:     IterationCaps,\n27:     ContextBudget,\n28:     CostTracker,\n29:     cap_tool_result,\n30: )\n31: from session_control import AbortController, FileRollback, kill_in_flight\n32: \n33: load_dotenv()\n34: \n35: # Raw, in-process tool registry. Action tools are replaced below with\n36: # wrappers that dispatch into the Docker sandbox container.\n37: RAW_TOOL_REGISTRY = get_tool_registry()\n38: \n39: # Limit output scope: the schemas exposed to the LLM carry bounds\n40: # (min/max on offset/limit, maxLength on command/content/url, relative-\n41: # path format on glob patterns).  These bounds are enforced host-side by\n42: # TOOL_VALIDATOR before any tool is allowed to run.\n43: TOOL_SCHEMAS = bounded_schemas(get_tool_schemas())\n44: TOOL_VALIDATOR = ToolValidator(TOOL_SCHEMAS)\n45: \n46: # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n47: # Permission modes\n48: # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n49: \n50: \n51: class PermissionMode(Enum):\n52:     DEFAULT = \"default\"\n53:     ACCEPT_EDITS = \"acceptEdits\"\n54:     DANGEROUSLY_SKIP_PERMISSIONS = \"dangerouslySkipPermissions\"\n55: \n56: \n57: # Always allowed: read-only filesystem tools\n58: READ_TOOLS = {\"read_file\", \"glob_files\", \"grep\"}\n59: \n60: # Always allowed: internal planning/bookkeeping and user-interaction tools (no external side effects)\n61: PLANNING_TOOLS = {\"todo_append\", \"todo_list\", \"todo_update\",\n62:                   \"read_scratchpad\", \"write_scratchpad\", \"ask_question\"}\n63: \n64: # Conditionally allowed in acceptEdits mode when target is within working dir\n65: WRITE_TOOLS = {\"write_file\", \"edit_file\"}\n66: \n67: \n68: def _resolve_tool_path(tool_name: str, args: dict) -> str | None:\n69:     \"\"\"Return the file-path argument for write tools, or None if not applicable.\"\"\"\n70:     if tool_name in WRITE_TOOLS:\n71:         return args.get(\"path\")\n72:     return None\n73: \n74: \n75: def _is_within_working_dir(path: str, working_dir: Path) -> bool:\n76:     \"\"\"Return True if *path* resolves to somewhere inside *working_dir*.\"\"\"\n77:     try:\n78:         target = Path(path)\n79:         if not target.is_absolute():\n80:             target = working_dir / target\n81:         target.resolve().relative_to(working_dir.resolve())\n82:         return True\n83:     except ValueError:\n84:         return False\n85: \n86: \n87: def _ask_permission(tool_name: str, args: dict) -> bool:\n88:     \"\"\"Interactively ask the user whether to allow a tool call.\n89: \n90:     Returns True if the user grants permission, False otherwise.\n91:     \"\"\"\n92:     print(f\"\\n  [permission required] {tool_name}\")\n93:     print(f\"  Arguments: {json.dumps(args, ensure_ascii=False)}\")\n94:     while True:\n95:         try:\n96:             answer = input(\"  Allow this action? [y/n]: \").strip().lower()\n97:         except EOFError:\n98:             print(\"  (EOF — denying permission)\")\n99:             return False\n100:         if answer in (\"y\", \"yes\"):\n101:             return True\n102:         if answer in (\"n\", \"no\"):\n103:             return False\n104:         print(\"  Please enter 'y' or 'n'.\")\n105: \n106: \n107: def check_permission(\n108:     tool_name: str,\n109:     args: dict,\n110:     mode: PermissionMode,\n111:     working_dir: Path,\n112: ) -> tuple[bool, str | None]:\n113:     \"\"\"Decide whether a tool call is permitted under the current mode.\n114: \n115:     Returns ``(allowed, reason)``.  When ``allowed`` is False, ``reason``\n116:     explains why and is surfaced to the LLM.  May interactively prompt\n117:     the user when a decision cannot be made automatically.\n118: \n119:     Three layers, evaluated in order:\n120: \n121:       1. Tool policy: a hard gate that no mode can\n122:          override: path scoping, shell denylist, SSRF guard.\n123:       2. Always-confirm patterns: destructive calls require\n124:          explicit confirmation even in acceptEdits, and selected\n125:          irreversible patterns refuse even in dangerouslySkipPermissions.\n126:       3. Mode-based decision (default / acceptEdits / skip).\n127: \n128:     Permission rules (layer 3)\n129:     --------------------------\n130:     default\n131:         Read tools and planning tools run freely.  Every other tool\n132:         requires explicit user approval.\n133: \n134:     acceptEdits\n135:         Read tools and planning tools run freely.  Write tools\n136:         (write_file, edit_file) run freely only when the target path is\n137:         inside the working directory; otherwise the user is prompted.\n138:         All other tools require explicit user approval.\n139: \n140:     dangerouslySkipPermissions\n141:         All tools run without any prompt EXCEPT calls blocked by layer\n142:         1 (hard policy) or layer 2 (always-confirm / irreversible).\n143:     \"\"\"\n144:     # Layer 1: hard policy gate (path scope, shell, SSRF).\n145:     ok, reason = tool_policy.check_tool_policy(tool_name, args, working_dir)\n146:     if not ok:\n147:         return False, reason\n148: \n149:     # Layer 2: always-confirm & irreversible patterns.\n150:     # These override even dangerouslySkipPermissions for the worst cases.\n151:     if tool_policy.always_confirm_required(tool_name, args):\n152:         if mode == PermissionMode.DANGEROUSLY_SKIP_PERMISSIONS:\n153:             # Irreversible calls are refused outright in skip mode; the\n154:             # user explicitly accepted risk for normal destructive ops,\n155:             # but not for e.g. `rm -rf /` or `git push --force`.\n156:             return False, (\n157:                 f\"Blocked even in dangerouslySkipPermissions: {\n158:                     reason or 'irreversible action'}. \"\n159:                 \"Run this command manually outside the agent if it is truly intended.\"\n160:             )\n161:         # In default / acceptEdits, force an explicit prompt.\n162:         return _ask_permission(f\"{tool_name}  [DESTRUCTIVE]\", args), None\n163: \n164:     # Planning and read tools are always free regardless of mode\n165:     if tool_name in READ_TOOLS or tool_name in PLANNING_TOOLS:\n166:         return True, None\n167: \n168:     if mode == PermissionMode.DANGEROUSLY_SKIP_PERMISSIONS:\n169:         return True, None\n170: \n171:     if mode == PermissionMode.ACCEPT_EDITS and tool_name in WRITE_TOOLS:\n172:         path = _resolve_tool_path(tool_name, args)\n173:         if path and _is_within_working_dir(path, working_dir):\n174:             # an edit that empties an existing file is a delete —\n175:             # require confirmation rather than auto-approving.\n176:             if _is_delete_via_write(tool_name, args, path):\n177:                 return _ask_permission(f\"{tool_name}  [DELETE-via-empty]\", args), None\n178:             return True, None  # auto-approved — within the working directory\n179:         # Path is outside the working directory → fall through to ask\n180: \n181:     # Default mode, or acceptEdits for non-write / out-of-tree tools\n182:     return _ask_permission(tool_name, args), None\n183: \n184: \n185: def _is_delete_via_write(tool_name: str, args: dict, path: str) -> bool:\n186:     \"\"\"Return True if a write_file/edit_file call effectively deletes a file.\n187: \n188:     - ``write_file`` overwriting an existing file with empty/whitespace\n189:       content is treated as a delete.\n190:     - ``edit_file`` replacing content with empty content on a file that\n191:       becomes empty is also flagged.\n192:     \"\"\"\n193:     if tool_name == \"write_file\":\n194:         content = args.get(\"content\", \"\")\n195:         if not content.strip():\n196:             try:\n197:              ", "truncated_from_size": 8348, "sha256": "d3223458bfc63ff659750cfc2ec2dd4e1ee63b9a6ad41700cf4f67c3a58719f8"}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:43.250+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "iteration_cap_hit", "scope": "per_turn", "turns": 4, "tool_calls": 3}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:36:43.250+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "llm_request", "model": "gemma4", "message_count": 9, "token_estimate": 4463, "has_tools": true}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:37:09.175+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "llm_response", "model": "gemma4", "finish_reason": "stop", "usage": {"prompt_tokens": 6674, "completion_tokens": 780}, "message_hash": "e45778facb4e1b2ee369fe8c13397cf787869056365d29b25b9f03a2c1645967", "tool_call_count": 0}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T18:37:09.175+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "assistant_message", "content": "Based on the current constraints, I have reached the per-turn iteration cap and must stop making tool calls. Here is a concise summary of the progress made toward your goal: \"Read every file in this directory and write a one-line summary of each.\"\n\n**Progress Summary:**\n\n1.  **File Discovery:** I successfully used `glob_files` to list all files in the current directory, identifying core source files (`agent.py`, `.py` modules), configuration files (`Dockerfile`), log directories, and cached metadata.\n2.  **Content Reading (Initial Files):** I have read the contents of two key files:\n\n    *   **`./Dockerfile`:** This file sets up a Python 3.12 slim container, installing `beautifulsoup4`. It is configured to keep running indefinitely (`CMD [\"sleep\", \"infinity\"]`) because the agent's tools are expected to be mounted at runtime.\n    *   **`./agent.py`:** This is the main logic file defining the AI agent. It manages tool usage through wrappers that dispatch calls into a secure Docker sandbox. It implements critical safety features like `ToolValidator`, permission checks (`check_permission`), and adherence to internal policies (tool policy, resource limits).\n\n**Remaining Scope & Limitations:**\n\n*   **Incomplete Coverage:** The initial list of files is very extensive, including multiple log files (`./logs/...`) and numerous Python cache directories (`./__pycache__/...`).\n*   **Constraint Met:** Due to the \"per-turn iteration cap\" you indicated, I cannot proceed with reading or summarizing the remaining dozens of files.\n\nTo complete the original request, I would need permission to continue iterating through all listed files.", "tool_calls": []}
{"ts": "2026-07-26T19:07:27.636+00:00", "session": "4a01ec73cc73", "event": "session_end"}